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The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War
“A magniﬁcent book, another tour de force in combined diplomatic, political, and naval history.”—n. a. m. rodger, author of The
Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain
“Dull has written a magisterial history of the war and the role of
the French Navy. . . . This history will long stand as the deﬁnitive
work on the French Navy of the period.”—h a r o l d n . b o y e r ,
Sea History
“This book is not merely a history of the French Navy but a step-bystep exposition of a hugely complex war, laid out by a single historian whose starting point is the diplomacy and politics of the protagonists, and who ﬁts the French Navy into this framework. . . . Dull
skillfully places the last piece in the jigsaw and constructs a sophisticated view of the war from the perspective of Versailles, while at
the same time presenting a patient and detailed analysis of the British war effort.”—roger knight, Mariner’s Mirror
“Those interested in learning the inside story of how governments actually conduct war will ﬁnd this a fascinating work, and
a sobering reﬂection of how they probably still carry on today.”
—robert guttman, Military History
“This excellent book deserves a wide audience. It far surpasses
most histories of the Seven Years’ War. . . . This book belongs
on the shelf of anyone seriously interested in early American
and Atlantic history, French maritime and naval history, and in
the history of international relations in the eighteenth century.”
—james pritchard, Journal of Military History
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“Dull’s book is a monument to careful scholarship. With clear, concise prose, he navigates deftly through a complex tale of war, diplomacy, and politics. His book is the deﬁnitive work on this topic.”
—Canadian Journal of History
“With the publication of Jonathan R. Dull’s The French Navy and
the Seven Years’ War, we at last have an accessible, brisk, and erudite narrative of this global struggle.”—r a f e b l a u f a r b , Journal of Modern History
“An impressive and an important addition to the literature. The
French Navy and the Seven Years’ War will for years to come be
an essential addition to the library of specialists and students
of eighteenth century naval (and diplomatic) history alike.”
—olaf uwe janzen, Northern Mariner
“There are a great many books for English-speaking readers concerning the British Royal Navy in the 18th century, but not many
that provide solid, well-researched material concerning its greatest rival, the French Navy. Dull helps ﬁll in that gap and provides
some much-needed balance with this work. Overall, this is a muchneeded study for any scholar interested in this time period or in
western naval and maritime history.”—Choice
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Preface

Between 1689 and 1815 the British (or initially the English allied
with the Scots) fought seven wars against France. Their navies
played an important, sometimes critical, role. The power of the rival navies was based chieﬂy on their ships of the line, great wooden warships carrying two or three tiers of iron or brass cannon. The
age of the ship of the line is largely the story of the navies of Britain and France, the two powers best able to afford the massively
expensive ﬂeets of ships of the line. Although Spain and the Netherlands maintained good sized navies throughout the period, by
the early eighteenth century they had become subordinate players in the naval rivalry of Britain and France. Other navies, such
as those of Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Naples, and Venice, were
regional powers, largely restricted to the Baltic or Mediterranean
Seas. The goal of this book is to explain the background, course,
and results of the seven wars between the British and French, particularly the causes of the ﬁnal British triumph.
By treating the British and French navies in tandem I hope to
give a balanced account of their rivalry; I confess to loving both
countries and warmly supporting their friendship. The statesmen
of the eighteenth century generally saw war not primarily as a contest of societies but more as a contest of economies, in which victory
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preface

went to the strongest, not to the “best,” and in which the chief virtue was endurance. I approach these wars in much the same way,
using ships of the line as the measure of strength. Thus this book
pays as much attention to the number of ships of the line engaged
in the various campaigns as to the admirals and statesmen who directed them. In all the Franco-British wars of the period, including
the one Britain lost, the War of American Independence, the side
that could put the most ships of the line to sea was successful.
I have learned much by conversations with historians more
knowledgeable than I am in nautical matters. I am particularly
grateful to Daniel Baugh, Richard Harding, John Hattendorf, Roger Knight, Nicholas Rodger, Patrick Villiers, and Clive Wilkinson;
the mistakes I have made are totally my responsibility. Some of
these conversations took place during either a 2005 trip to Paris
or a 2006 trip to Greenwich, England, made possible, respectively, by the Association France-Amériques and the National Maritime Museum. I am extremely grateful to the members of both
organizations for their generosity, hospitality, and kindness, particularly to Patricia Cédelle and Janet Norton, who handled the respective arrangements.
In the interest of saving space I will not repeat the acknowledgments
to friends and colleagues that I made in my last book, The French
Navy and the Seven Years’ War. I am still indebted to all of them for
their help or encouragement. I must, however, again thank my
sister, Caroline Hamburger, for her hospitality during the times I
was in London, and my wife, Susan Kruger, for her constant helpfulness and support. I dedicate this book to my children, Veronica
Lamka, Robert Dull, Max Kruger-Dull, and Anna Kruger-Dull, in
the hope that someday they will live in a world without war.
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1. The Ship of the Line Begins Its Reign

I

Between the 1650s and the 1850s, naval warfare was ruled by the
ship of the line and the line of battle after which it was named.
These huge three-masted wooden ships were some 120 to 210 feet
long with a beam (width) of 30 to 60 feet. They carried between
40 and 130 cannon mounted along two, three, or, in the case of
the Spanish ship of the line Santísima Trinidad, four decks.1 The
ship of the line was the most expensive, technologically advanced,
and visually impressive weapon of its day. It also was the measure
of national naval power, like the dreadnought of World War I or
the aircraft carrier of World War II. The line of battle—a string of
warships following each other bow to stern—was the best way to
bring its power to bear, as each ship thus could give support to
neighboring ships. Only in shallow or poorly charted waters, like
the eastern Baltic, was the ship of the line not dominant; there the
galley, a shallow-draft oar-powered warship, continued to play a
major role throughout the eighteenth century.
The era of the ship of the line began when its two components,
the ship of the line and the line of battle, were combined. That
time was long in coming. The line of battle is so logical an arrangement that the earliest groups of European ships carrying cannon
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sometimes made use of it. A Portuguese ﬂeet commanded by Vasco
da Gama seems to have employed a line of battle off the coast of
India in 1502.2 Its use was intermittent, however, because its main
advantage was mutual support in an artillery duel. Some naval
battles consisted of such duels; the English, for example, foiled the
Spanish Armada of 1588 by the use of cannon. Until the middle
of the seventeenth century, however, naval warfare often involved
either boarding (ships grappling an opponent and then dispatching
a boarding party) or the use of ﬁre ships (setting ships on ﬁre in
order to ram them into enemy vessels). The Dutch, who by the 1640s
had become the greatest naval power in Europe, were masters of
a variety of tactics. In 1639, they used both a line of battle and ﬁre
ships against a huge Spanish ﬂeet off the English coast.3
The use of great ships of 50 or more cannon also was long established by 1650. Most major naval powers had one or more of these
ships, such as the English Prince Royal of 55 cannon, launched in
1610, and the Sovereign of the Seas, 90 cannon, launched in 1637, or
the French Couronne, 68, launched in 1638. These ships, however,
were clumsy to sail and expensive to build, man, and maintain. As
an admiral’s ﬂagship they could be useful in a battle, but without
other ships of similar size they could not alter the disorganized
melee of a naval battle based on boarding or the use of ﬁre ships.
Fleets during the ﬁrst half of the seventeenth century were very
heterogeneous, moreover, frequently consisting mostly of converted
merchant ships.
A turning point came in 1649 when the Parliament of England
decided to build a group of very large and heavily armed frigates
(fast, medium-sized warships usually carrying 20 or more cannon)
that was the predecessor of groups (or “classes”) of ships of the line
of a standard size. The thirteen ships of the Speaker class, launched
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between 1650 and 1654, were of roughly similar size (about 750
tons) and carried 48 to 56 cannon; in tonnage and armament they
were similar to a very large galleon, the chief warship of the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and still the mainstay
of the Spanish navy, but they were longer, lower, and faster than
galleons. No other navy had a group of ships to match them; the
Dutch navy, hitherto Europe’s best, continued to rely chieﬂy on
taking merchant ships into naval service.4
The line of battle ﬁrst was used, however, before most of the
Speaker class were launched. Both England and the United Provinces
of the Netherlands were republics, Charles I of England having
been executed in 1649. Both were Protestant, too, although different enough in persuasion to create tension. It could be argued
that they were natural allies against Catholic monarchies such as
Spain and France; at any rate, geography did not automatically make
them enemies. They were bitter trade rivals, however. Outside of
Europe, trade rivalry, particularly for spices in Asia or slaves in
Africa, frequently involved the use of force. As there were no effective international means of mediating disputes, the Netherlands
and England were unable to resolve their trading disputes, and
each feared domination by the other. As the crisis worsened, each
tried to intimidate the other, leading in 1652 to a war that could
have been avoided.5
Although the new English battle ﬂeet temporarily disrupted
Dutch shipping and fought several battles, the ﬁrst campaign of
the war was indecisive. On 29 March 1653 the three ofﬁcers jointly
commanding the English navy issued instructions that guaranteed
its ﬂeets henceforth would ﬁght in a battle line. Two months later the
English won a smashing victory off the Gabbard shoal in the North
Sea, largely due to their use of the line of battle.6 This marriage of
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ship and tactics endured for two centuries. The sailing ship line
of battle dominated naval warfare through the Battle of Sinope in
1853, in which a line of Russian ships of the line destroyed a group
of Turkish frigates. During the ensuing Crimean War of 1854–56,
ships of the line, including some equipped with auxiliary steam
power, were the chief naval weapon, although by now they were
vulnerable to explosive shells. The death blow to the ship of the
line, however, was the launching of the ﬁrst iron warships in the
early 1860s.7 The line of battle persisted through the age of iron
and steel battleships, though, until the last great ﬂeet action, the
1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf.
II

What accounts for so enduring a marriage between this weapon and
these tactics? In part, both were the product of the same technological advances, the creation of large cannon ﬁring extremely heavy
cannonballs and the development of gun ports, openings cut in the
sides of ships through which cannon could ﬁre. It took a very large
ship to carry banks of cannon weighing several tons apiece. Equally
important the ship needed great strength to withstand the impact
of cannon balls sometimes weighing as much as 42 pounds; in the
late eighteenth century, the British even developed cannon ﬁring a
68-pound ball. Ships needed as many cannon as they could carry,
using equal numbers on both sides, starboard and port. Moreover,
ships needed large crews to work their sails and ﬁre their cannon; a
French cannon ﬁring a 36-pound ball, for example, weighed more
than four tons and needed fourteen men to ﬁre it.8 Although crew
members slept and ate among the guns, ships needed space for water,
food and drink, munitions, and various spare parts and supplies.
The ship of the line was like a ﬂoating fortress, but it had points
of weakness that a fortress did not. Its bow and stern could not be
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as strong and straight as its sides if it were to maneuver through the
water, and it had room for only a few cannon facing directly ahead
or astern. This made it vulnerable to a volley of cannon balls ﬁred
from directly in front or behind it. Not only could these penetrate
more easily, but also once inside an enemy ship they would ﬁnd
little resistance, since the ship of the line was not divided into compartments like a modern steel ship. Such an attack, called “raking,”
usually inﬂicted heavy casualties and damage. A lone ship had only
its speed and maneuverability to protect it from raking; on its own a
ship of the line was vulnerable even to frigates, which were smaller
but more nimble except in a heavy wind. The best protection for
a ship of the line was having other ships of the line just ahead of
and just behind it. This mutual support against raking depended
on the ships sailing together in as close and straight a line as possible. This line of battle also had offensive advantages. If ﬂeets were
passing in opposite directions, each ship could pound the hulls or
ﬁre into the masts of several opponents in succession.
The line of battle also was effective, particularly as a defensive
tactic, because of other limitations of wooden sailing warships.
There were two major ways of overcoming a line of battle. The ﬁrst
was “doubling” one of the ends of the line, that is, placing warships
on both sides of the enemy ships at either the front or back end
of the line. The second was to break the line by a concentration
of force somewhere in its middle. Both tactics were very difﬁcult
unless the attacker had a considerable advantage in numbers or
skill, because it was much easier for sailing ships to keep formation
and maintain mutual support while on the defensive. Difﬁculties
in communicating between ships and in maneuvering in unison
made coordinating an attack so challenging that decisions in battle
usually had to be left to individual ship captains.
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Throughout most of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
it was rare for a ﬂeet of superior size to suffer a decisive defeat. Sir
Cloudesley Shovell, one of the leading admirals at the beginning
of the eighteenth century, claimed that without a miracle, numbers
would gain the victory.9 Although generally British warships were
sturdier and their crews better trained that were the French, the
differences in quality between them usually were not enough to
produce a major victory unless there was a substantial difference
in numbers. Most battles ended with few ships being lost, and
generally casualties were fewer than those in land battles involving
similar numbers of men. Captured French ships served alongside British ones and vice versa. Decisive battles, such as the 1759
Battle of Quiberon, usually came after the quality of French crews
had drastically declined. After the onset of the French Revolution,
however, the French navy underwent a rapid decline, largely due to
shortages of funds, sailors, and supplies. Admiral Horatio Nelson’s
defeat of a larger Franco-Spanish ﬂeet at Trafalgar was due less to
his genius than to the poor quality of the ﬂeet opposing him. Such
a battle was unusual. In most cases the key factor in a battle was
numerical superiority.
In spite of Nelson’s victories there was relatively little evolution in
naval tactics between 1660 and 1815. Similarly the evolution of the
ship of the line was gradual and unspectacular until the nineteenth
century. The maximum size of a ship of the line increased slowly
over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the 120-gun Nelson
of 1805 was only 70 percent larger than the Sovereign of the Seas of
1637.10 Vital components such as sternposts and mainmasts were
best constructed from a single tree, whose maximum size was
limited by nature. The British navy tried to compensate by packing
more guns on the decks of its vessels, but this did not work very well;
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an 80-gun French ship was almost as large and as powerful as a
100-gun British ship. The ﬁrst “revolution” in the design of the ship
of the line did not occur until near the end of its existence with the
invention of the screw propeller and the use of steam. Admittedly
the ship of the line did beneﬁt from continual improvements such
as the development in the late eighteenth century of copper plating
for hulls, which retarded the growth of marine organisms.
Such improvements, even if gradual, had some effect on naval
warfare. A major difference between seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury navies was their endurance. The former was generally held
in port during winter weather while the latter could ﬁght year-round;
the newer ships were less top-heavy and more maneuverable thanks
to larger and better designed hulls and improvements in rigging
and sails.11 A second difference was a large increase in the number
of seamen per ship; for example, in 1690 a French 80-gun ship
carried a crew of 600, a 74-gun ship a crew of 500, and a 64-gun
ship a crew of 400. By 1759 an 80-gun ship required 860 men, a
74-gun ship required 695, and a 64-gun ship required 500. Slightly
more than half of the crews were petty ofﬁcers and trained sailors.
The remainder were ship’s boys, marines, and various landsmen.
The same development occurred in the British navy.12
The requirements for a ship to serve in the line of battle also
increased. In the middle of the seventeenth century, a ship with 40
cannon qualiﬁed as a ship of the line, but by the beginning of the
eighteenth century at least 48 or 50 were needed. At the Battle of
Beachy Head in 1690, for example, half of the French line of battle of
seventy ships were ships mounting 50 to 58 cannon, although only
one had fewer than 50. By the middle of the eighteenth century, 64
cannon generally were needed, and in the 1780s, the French navy
began phasing out ships carrying fewer than 74. The cumulative
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effect was navies of bigger ships and more crewmen, which cost
much more money. Louis XIV’s navy of 1692 had ninety-ﬁve ships
of the line plus half a dozen warships of 44 or 46 cannon, but only
forty-nine ships carried 64 or more cannon; in 1782 the French
navy had seventy-two ships of the line, of which sixty-seven carried
64 or more.13
III

Although the English had a head start over the Dutch in the development of both the ship of the line and the line of battle, the ﬁrst
war between the two states (1652–54) was not decisive. During
the war, power in the Commonwealth passed from Parliament to
Oliver Cromwell. Faced with other threats, he did not choose to
exploit the naval supremacy gained by the English navy. He signed
a compromise peace with the States General, the ruling body of the
Netherlands. After Cromwell’s death in late 1658, public support
for the republic collapsed, in large part because of an expensive
war against Spain begun in 1655. In 1660 the Stuart monarchy was
restored. Naval construction slowed temporarily, largely because
Parliament did not trust the new king, Charles II, but it did not
completely stop.14 Charles II was a strong supporter of the navy,
and his brother James served as lord high admiral between 1660
and 1673. The navy continued to have a strong inﬂuence on British politics and diplomacy. For James and Charles, the Dutch were
still the enemy, and the efforts to crush them had the potential side
beneﬁt of strengthening the monarchy against Parliament. As we
shall discuss in the next chapter, England fought two more wars
against the Netherlands (1665–67 and 1672–74), but they were less
successful than the ﬁrst had been. The Dutch learned from their
shortcomings in the ﬁrst war. They built larger ships and eventually adopted the line of battle.15 They also beneﬁted from excellent
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political leadership and superb admirals. During the last of these
wars, however, the Dutch were ﬁghting for survival against another
rival, one that had a far larger population than England as well as
a huge army and a large navy. The English, too, soon realized that
the Dutch were no longer their chief rival. A new competitor for
both their navies had arisen: the navy of France.
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